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abstract
ImPerIal Past of ancIent lItHuanIa In tHe HIstorIcal memory 
of tHe modern IndePendent lItHuanIa
The paper is an inquiry into the origins and impact on the historical culture of modern Lithu-
ania of the view of GDL as an empire. The inventor or discoverer of the GDL as empire was 
a Lithuanian geographer and geopolitician Kazys Pakštas (1893–1960), who provided seminal im-
periological analysis of the ancient Lithuanian polity in his book Political Geography of Baltic 
Republics (1929). This work was probably the main source of inspiration for the Antanas Smetona 
(1874–1944), who was Lithuanian President in the years 1926–1940. He repeatedly designated 
GDL as an empire in his speeches, starting with the celebration of the 500th death anniversary of 
Vytautas Magnus in 1930. An important exponent of this idea was Vytautas Alantas (1902–1990), 
who served as editor-in-chief of a semi-official newspaper “Lietuvos Aidas” in 1934–1939 and 
contributed to the discourse on GDL as an empire in the Lithuanian diaspora. Because of ideologi-
cal reasons, the subject of ancient Lithuanian imperialism was avoided by Lithuanian historians in 
the Soviet era. In the post-communist times, Gintaras Beresnevičius (1961–2006) resurrected and 
popularized the idea of GDL as an empire to legitimize the Eastern strategy of the foreign policy of 
the contemporary Lithuanian state and to mythologize the challenges of the Lithuanian membership 
in the European Union. Because of the mainstream historiography’s commitment to hermeneutic 
methodology (historism), Lithuanian academic historiography in the interwar period remained cau-
tious about the very idea of GDL as an empire. 
Key words: comparative research on empires, historical culture of the interwar Lithuania, Kazys 
Pakštas, Vytautas Alantas, Antanas Smetona, Gintaras Beresnevičius
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IntroductIon
The paper contributes to discussion whether old Lithuanian state, the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania (GDL), was an empire. Scattered references to the old “Lithuanian em-
pire” or “Vytautas the Great Empire” can be found in the Lithuanian international 
(Alfredas Bumblauskas, Zenonas Ivinskis, Alvydas Nikžentaitis) and international 
historiography (Henryk Łowmianski, Stephen C. Rowell, William Urban),1 and also 
in texts from other areas of the Lithuanian historical culture (e.g. Antanas Andrijaus-
kas, Gintaras Beresnevičius, Algimantas Bučys, Romualdas Ozolas, Kazys Pakštas).2 
However, there are authors (e.g. Jevgenij Machovenko, Giedrė Mickūnaitė)3 who 
dispute this statement. However, up to the recent time, there was no systematic in-
vestigation of the imperial features of the ancient Lithuanian state. I have made an 
attempt to fill up this gap in the book Nepasiskelbusioji imperija,4 which is accesible 
only in Lithuanian, with part of the argument published also in Polish.5 
In the first part of present paper I provide the plea for comparative “imperiologi-
cal” analysis of the ancient Lithuanian polity which is continued by the discussion 
of the changing perceptions of its imperial features in the historical culture of the 
modern Lithuania. First section of the paper explains how concepts of “empire” and 
“imperialism” can be useful for the historical research on the GDL. Second section 
provides the survey how this vocabulary was used in the interwar Lithuania (1918– 
–1940), and third section tells about how and why the idea of GDL was resurrected 
in the II Republic of Lithuania.
1 A. Bumblauskas, Senosios Lietuvos istorija 1009–1795, Vilnius 2005; Z. Iv in sk i s, Lietuvos 
istorija iki Vytauto Didžiojo mirties, Roma 1978; A. N ikžen ta i t i s, The “Imperial” Diplomacy of 
Lithuania, “Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review” 2005, No. 1–2, p. 41–47; H. Łowmiańsk i, Polityka 
Jagiellonów, 2nd ed., Poznań 2006; S.C. Rowe l l, Iš viduramžių ūkų kylanti Lietuva. Pagonių imperija 
Rytų ir Vidurio Europoje, 1295–1345, Vilnius 2004; W. Urban, Žalgiris ir kas po jo: Lietuva, Lenkija ir 
Vokiečių Ordinas – nemirtingumo beeieškant, Vilnius 2004.
2 A. Andr i j auskas, LDK europėjimo tendencijos ir kultūrinio tapatumo paieškos tarp Rytų ir Vakarų 
[in:] A. Andr i j auskas  (ed.), Lietuviškojo europietiškumo raida: dabarties ir ateities iššūkiai, Vilnius 
2006, p. 18–48; G. Be re snev ič iu s, Imperijos darymas. Lietuviškos ideologijos metmenys. Europos 
Sąjunga ir Lietuvos geopolitika XXI a. pirmoje pusėje, Vilnius 2003; A. Bučys, Barbarai vice versa 
klasikai: centras ir periferija rašytojo strategijose, Vilnius 2008; R. Ozo la s, Supratimai. Parinktos 
1956–2006 metų metafizinio dienoraščio mintys, Vilnius 2007; K. Pakš t a s, Baltijos respublikų politinė 
geografia, Kaunas 1929; K. Pakš t a s, Lietuvos valstybės plotai ir sienos, “Lietuvių Enciklopedija” 1968 
(Boston), vol. 15, p. 450–464; S. Suž i edė l i s, Vytautas Didysis ir jo žygiai, Kaunas 1935.
3 J. Machovenko, Nelietuviškų žemių teisinė padėtis Lietuvos Didžiojoje Kunigaikštystėje (XIV– 
–XVIII a.), Vilnius 1999; G. Mickūna i t ė, Empire as Nostalgia, or a la recherche de terres perdues, 
“Ab Imperio. Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space” 2004, No. 4, 
p. 523–528.
4 Z. Norkus, Nepasiskelbusioji imperija. Lietuvos Didžioji Kunigaikštija lyginamosios imperijų 
istorinės sociologijos požiūriu [An Unproclaimed Empire. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the 
Viewpoint of Comparative Historical Sociology], Vilnius 2009.
5 Idem, Imperium litewskie w międzyjednostkowych społecznościach i systemach politycznych. 
Studium przypadku, “Politeja” 2011, vol. 2, p. 129–153. On this occasion, I would like thank the translator 
Katarzyna Korzeniewska and prof. dr. hab. Lidia Korczak for the academic editing of the translation. 
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I. can a Grand ducHy be an emPIre?
The idea of GDL as empire may appear as silly for the historians, who prefer to 
work with concepts, which are as close to the sources as possible. As a matter of 
common knowledge among medievalists, in the Middle Ages there were only two 
political bodies broadly recognized as “empires” (kingdoms of kingdoms) – polities 
claiming the continuation or succession of Roman empire. These polities were Holy 
Roman Empire (since 962) and Eastern Roman (or Byzantine) Empire (untill 1453). 
As a matter of fact, some minor medieval rulers called themselves emperors at vari-
ous times too, although these claims were not recognized by Roman Popes or Con-
stantinople Patriarchs. The list of self-proclaimed emperors include Anglo-Saxonian 
kings in Xth, kings of Leon and Castilia in X–XIIth centuries, Bulgarian (in the Xth and 
the XIIth centuries) and Serbian (in XIVth century) rulers.6
This list may be supplemented by GDL ruler Algirdas, who called himself βασιλεýς 
in the letter addresed to patriarch of Constantinople: ¢π{ τ{ν βασιλÝα Λιτβ™ν τ{ν 
#Áλγερδον (“from Lithuanian emperor Algirdas”), } βασιλε†ς } #Áλγερδος (em-
peror Algirdas).7 This was violation of the Byzantine diplomatic protocol of this time, 
which prescribed to call βασιλεýς only the ruler of Constantinople. Algirdas and the 
likes were expected to call themselves …[ξ or μÝγας …[ξ. After Vytautas the Great 
died in 1430 after unsuccessful attempt to crown himself as Lithuanian king, there 
were some initiatives of Lithuanian magnates to elevate Lithuania to kingdom, but 
never to empire. 
Since late XVth century, the Moscow rulers claimed the legacy of Eastern Ro-
man empire, using the doctrine of “Third Rome” to legitimate Muscovy’s expan-
sion. Lithuania answered claiming Roman descent of its nobles.8 According to one 
version of this genealogy, mythical ancestor of Lithuanian ruling dynasty Palem-
onas was a relative of Roman emperor Nero. Proud of their allegedly ancient Roman 
origins, Lithuanian nobles distanced themselves both from Baltic and Slavic com-
moners and claimed equality if no superiority with respect to Polish magnates, who 
believed their descent from ancient Sarmatians. However, Palemonas legend was 
never used to claim legacy of Roman empire for ruling dynasty Lithuania (and Po-
land) – Gediminaičiai/Jogailaičiai. So what is the point to describe GDL as empire? 
As a matter of fact, medievalists have neither monopoly over the use of the concept 
of empire in general, nor over the research on medieval politics. In the Soviet Union, 
one could get prison sentence for calling this polity empire. Now this is established 
and even politically correct designation for Soviet state. United States of America is 
6 See: R. Fo lz, The Concept of Empire in Western Europe from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Century, 
2nd ed., London 1969; J. Muldoon, Empire and Order. The Concept of Empire, 800–1800, Houndmills 
1999; D. Obo lensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth. Eastern Europe, 500–1453, London 1971. 
7 Acta patriarchatus Constantinopolitani, vol. 1, hrsg. F. Mik los i ch, J. Mül l e r, Vindobonae 1860, 
p. 580. 
8 See e.g. J. Ju rk i ewicz, Od Palemona do Giedymina. Wczesnonowożytne wyobrażenia 
o początkach Litwy, cz. 1: W kręgu latopisów litewskich, Poznań 2012.
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not an empire according to its constitution, but there is a lot of books about U.S. as em-
pire, written by famous historians and political scientists. Some of them have reputa-
tion of ardent American patriots.9 There are political scientists who said that European 
Union is an empire too – something like Holy Roman Empire 2.0.10 
Neither U.S., neither USSR in XXth century, nor Inca or Aztec polities in XV– 
–XVIth centuries claimed to be continuations, restorations, or inheritors of Roman 
empire. The same applies to Mongol polity, created by Chingis-Khan, China since 
IInd century B.C., Tamerlan and Mughal polities. However, the concept of “empire” 
provides best description for these very different polities, disclosing some important 
similarities. Romans did not invent empire. Ancient Assyria and Persian polities as 
well as the political conglomerate created for short time by Alexander the Great can 
be classified as empires too, although they antedate Roman conquests. Of course, Ro-
man empire was “classical” or ideal typical empire, but a polity does not need to be 
display complete similarity to ancient Roma or claim its legacy to qualify as empire.
This is common assumption in the comparative studies of empires, which are 
conducted in two social scientific disciplines – in the International Relations Studies 
and in the Comparative Politics. From the review of relevant literature one can distill 
following definition of empire: this is a (1) sovereign polity with (2) the size of ter-
ritory that exceeds significantly other polities of the same region and time and has at 
least three features from the following list: (3) it pursues territorial expansion on large 
scale; (4) it holds hegemony in the inter-polity system11 or strives after it; (5) it is eth-
nically or culturally heterogeneous and includes politically dominant ethnocultural 
minority; (6) it is differentiated into metropole and peripheries in terms of territory.
A polity, displaying full set of attributes (1)–(6), can be described as ideal typical 
empire. However, only first two attributes [(1)–(2)] are necessary features of em-
pires. To qualify as empire, it is sufficient for a polity to display at least three from 
remaining four [(3)–(6)] features. So the suggested definition of empire implies a ty-
pology of “non-classical” or “diminished type”12 empires which deviate from the 
ideal type of empire by lacking one from the attributes (3)–(6). These diminished 
or non-classical types of empires are (a) peaceful empires [lacking (3)]; (c) non- 
-hegemonic empires [absent (4)]; (d) ethnoculturally homogenous empires [absent 
(5)]; (e) teritorially homogenous empires (no differentiation into metropoles and pe-
riphery [absent (6)]. During its history, a particular polity can transform itself from 
one subtype to another. Against the common wisdom saying that “all empires break 
down – sooner or later”, some empires can transform into national states. Then their 
historians tell “grand narratives” about the successful fight against “feudal disunity” 
by their unifiers. 
9 See e.g. N. Fe rguson, Colossus. The Price of America’s Empire, New York 2004.
10 J. Z i e lonka, Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union, Oxford 2006.
11 This concept is used instead “international system” to avoid anachronism impending over the 
application of the concept “international system” in the contexts where no modern territorial or nation 
states are present.
12 Cp. D. Co l l i e r, R. Adcock, Democracy and Dichotomies. A Pragmatic Approach to Choices 
about Concepts, “Annual Review of Political Science” 1999, vol. 2, p. 537–565.
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Features (3) and (4) are elaborated in the body of literature on empires and im-
perialism produced in the field of International Relations Studies.13 This elaboration 
includes the concepts of the spheres of hegemony, suzerainty, dominion, and imperial 
core to describe the elements of an inter-polity system which constitute an empire. 
Importantly, although all empires are human made, not all of them are of human 
design. Instead, imperialism as process of subordination can be driven by metropole-
based (“metro-centric”), periphery-based (“peri-centric”) causes, or by transnational 
forces. This process involves the differentiation of an empire-in-making into the 
sphere of hegemony (no control over internal politics of peripheral polity by the 
metropolitan polity), an informal empire (control both over the foreign policy and 
internal politics without formal vassalage or incorporation of peripheral polity), and 
formal empire.
Features (5)–(6) are elaborated in the political science subdiscipline known as 
Comparative Politics which considers empire as composite polity antithetical to 
federation.14 The principle of subordination is common to both empire and federa-
tion. However, member polities of a federal polity are equal or equalized among 
themselves, and the federal center is different from the government of one of these 
member polities. This is not the case in an empire, where one of the member polities 
(metropole) dominates over others (peripheries). Besides that, in an empire there 
are no direct relations between the peripheries. It is like the hub without the rim: all 
relations between peripheries are mediated by the metropolitan centre, extracting and 
redistributing resources among peripheries according to the interests of the metro-
politan polity and its ruling elite. 
According to the established wisdom in the historiography of the GDL established 
by Mitrofan Dovnar-Zapolski and Matvei Lubavski, GDL was federation built by 
voluntary accession treaties which preserved complete internal autonomy of Russian 
lands. However, the proponents of federalist thesis mistake as federalism what was 
in reality a system of indirect rule characteristic of empires in pre-modern times. As 
a matter of fact, territorial organization of GDL displays typical features of imperial 
organization, as far as the relations between Lithuania in the strict sense (including 
also some Russian lands annexed in the XIIIth century) and Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smo-
lensk, Volhynia, Podole, Kievan lands and other dependent territories were those of 
the subordination of the periphery to imperial metropole.
Because of incessant wars with other Tatar empires, internal strife and plague 
Golden Horde was so weakened by the mid-XIVth century that the Lithuanians were 
able to penetrate into Southern and Southern West Rus’ and to make the attempt to 
put under their rule all lands of the former Kievan Rus’. This was the central idea of 
13 See e.g. H. Bu l l, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, London 1977; 
A. Wat son, The Evolution of International Society, London 1992; M. Wigh t, Systems of States, 
Leicester 1977. 
14 See e.g. M. Doy le, Empires, Ithaca–London 1986; S.N. E i sens t ad t, The Political Systems of 
Empires, New York 1963; S.E. F ine r, The History of Government from the Earliest Times, vol. 1–3, 
Oxford 1997; H. Münk le r, Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom Alten Rom bis zu den 
Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin 2005.
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Lithuanian imperialism and hegemonism pursued for a century by three Lithuanian 
rulers – Algirdas, Jogaila and Vytautas. Algirdas and Jogaila failed to break the re-
sistance of Moscow princes whose main source of strength was the control over the 
office of the highest Orthodox Church dignitary in the Rus’. However, Moscow was 
not able to establish its independence from the Tatar Empire that re-emerged to power 
for a brief time in the 1380s under Khan Tokhtamysh. But in the 1390s Tokhtamysh 
was defeated by the builder of another short-lived Central Asian empire Tamerlan, 
providing the Lithuanian ruler Vytautas with the chance for an attempt to put under 
his suzerainty not only all Russian lands, but also Golden Horde by making Tokhta-
mysh a puppet ruler of Golden Horde.15 
This would mean the replacing of Golden Horde by GDL in the role of suzerain 
power in the Eastern European inter-polity system. The defeat at Vorskla in 1399 pre-
cluded the realization of this enlarged version of the Lithuanian imperial idea. “If it 
had gone the other way, Vytautas might have separated from his cousin Wladyslaw of 
Poland, undone the union of Krevo, and reunited the Russians round Vilnius or Kiev 
rather than round Moscow.”16 However, during the last decade of his rule Vytautas 
was able to make true for a short time his program by establishing himself as the 
final arbiter in the power struggles among the pretenders to become a Golden Horde 
khan and the de facto regent (1425–1430) of the Grand Duchy of Moscow due to the 
preteen age of his grandson, the future grand prince of Moscow Vasily II the Dark. 
However, Lithuanian hegemony in Eastern Europe lasted only few years. The 
1449 treaty with Moscow sealed Lithuania’s resignation from hegemonic aspira-
tions in Eastern Europe, mainly due to the policies of the joint ruler of Poland and 
Lithuania Kazimieras Jogailaitis (Casimir Jagiellon). His preferences were to smash 
the Teutonic Order (attempted in the 1454–1466 war) and then to establish Poland’s 
hegemony in Central Europe by placing the Jagiellonian princes on the thrones of 
the Hungarian and Czech kingdoms. The GDL became a non-hegemonic regional 
empire. Differently from many empires, (in)famous as “prisons of nations,” the GDL 
served rather as a “cradle of nations.” 
The relative stabilization of its Eastern borders after huge territorial losses to the 
Muscovite state in the late XVth–early XVIth century was decisive for the emergence 
of three different Eastern Slavic nations (Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians) in-
stead of one Slavic ethnicity in Kievan Rus’. Although the GDL (and Poland) had 
succumbed to the military pressure of the Russian Empire by the XVIIIth century, 
neither this empire nor its successor, the Soviet Union, was able to assimilate all 
Eastern Slavic nationalities into the Great Russian nation. The only chance to make 
this Great Russian chauvinist dream come true was the eventual victory of the GDL 
over Moscow and the unification of all former Kievan Rus’ lands under the power 
of Lithuanian dynasty in the XIVth or the early XVth century. A barely avoidable col-
15 See: F. Šabu l ‘do, Vitovt i Timur: protivniki ili strategičeskie partnery? [in:] I. Va l ikony tė, 
E. Me i lu s, A. Mickev ič iu s  (eds.), Lietuva ir jos kaimynai. Nuo normanų iki Napoleono, Vilnius 
2001, p. 95–106.
16 S.A.M. Adshead, Central Asia in World History, New York 1993; http://coursesa.matrix.msu.
edu/~fisher/hst373/readings/tamerlane.html (access: 16.11.2013).
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lateral outcome of such victory would be Orthodox baptism and assimilation of all 
Baltic population in this contrary-to-fact “Vilnius Rus’.”
Among others, so argued Polish historian Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949), who 
may be the first professional historian self-consciously describing GDL as empire.17 
However, he wrote about GDL as empire in conjunctive, as unrealized possibility 
(niedoszle carstwo wilenskie) which could become true if Vytautas would be victori-
ous at Vorskla. According to Henryk Łowmianski, GDL was empire by 1385 on the 
eve of Krėvos treaty.18 The inner circle of Gediminaičiai dynasty may have consid-
ered dynastic union with Poland as just another step in the imperial expansion which 
was conducted not only by military force, but also by dynastic marriages. “In the 
Poland these expectations were not fulfilled,”19 as far as Poland was not a patrimonial 
polity like GDL but institutional state. 
However, another two goals of Lithuanian ruling elite were achieved. One of 
them was to check the expansion of Teutonic Order which endangered both Lithu-
ania and Poland. Another goal one was to get resources for the consolidation of the 
Gediminaičiai dynasty power over Russian provinces. “After Algirdas’ death the ma-
terial foundations of the nobility’s life were endangered by strong centrifugal forces 
in the Lithuanian empire which was freshly build by mechanical connection of the 
Russian provinces with Lithuanian center.”20 However, for the “soft” and “hard” re-
sources to maintain Russian provinces received from Poland, Lithuanians must pay 
the price. “Huge Gediminaičiai empire (imperium Giedyminowiczow) was resolved 
into composite parts, which became direct provinces or fiefs (bezposrednimi dzielni-
cami lub lenami) of Polish kingdom.”21 This was against expectations of Lithuanian 
nobility. “Did Lithuanians created empire to donate it lightheartedly to Poles?”22 So 
the Lithuanian metropolitan nobles supported Vytautas in his challenge to Jogaila. 
17 F. Koneczny, Dzieje Rosyi, vol. 1: Do roku 1449, Warszawa 1917, s. 403–428. 
18 Łowmianski’s idea of GDL as empire is a logical sequel to his influential theory of the emergence 
of the ancient state as the by-product of the Lithuanian plunder raids to Rus’ lands dating since 
XII century (see H. Łowmiańsk i, Studja nad początkami społeczeństwa i państwa litewskiego, vol. 1–2, 
Wilno 1931–1932). He maintained this view also in his late work: “The Lithuanian state has emerged 
not on the ground of the defense against the Teutonic Order, but on that of the expansion to Rus’” 
(H. Łowmiańsk i, Studia nad dziejami Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, Poznań 1983, p. 278).
19 H. Łowmiańsk i, Polityka Jagiellonów, wyd. 2, Poznań 2006, s. 38. Similar analysis of “Krėva 
situation” provides Domas Cesevičius: “Coming back shortly to the ‘union’ question, it is necessary to 
point out that Poles and Jogaila understood Krėva treaty differently. Poles thought and expected that after 
becoming Poland’s king Jogaila will incorporate into Poland kingdom the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 
which was polity of lesser status. Jogaila and other representatives of the dynasty close to him thought that 
they are incorporating Poland into Lithuanian Gediminaičiai dynasty, which was powerful at this time. 
Different interpretation and evaluation of Krėva treaty manifested itself by concrete misunderstandings 
soon, and even by the withdrawal of Lithuanians from the seeming union. It was necessary to norm 
Lithuanian-Polish relations by other agreements: the act of 1401 and that of 1413 year. D. Cesev ič iu s, 
Lietuvos ūkio istorijos eskizai, Vilnius 1960, F98–293, p. 25. 
20 H. Łowmiańsk i, Polityka Jagiellonów, p. 38. 
21 Ibidem, p. 60.
22 Ibidem. 
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As a matter of common knowledge, the dynastic conflict ended with compromise, 
preserving both GDL as distinct polity and the union with Kingdom of Poland.
Union of Horodło is only one in the long succession of the treaties reasserting 
this compromise. According to the definition of empire proposed above, sovereignty 
is necessary attribute of an empire. What then Polish-Lithuaniam union implies for 
description of GDL as empire? The texts of union treaties contain formulations which 
can be read as abolition of GDL as sovereign state or as restriction of its sovereignty. 
However, in terms of real politics which only matters for social scientific analysis, 
GDL remained completely sovereign. It pursued its own independent foreign and in-
ternal policies, and Poland had no decisive influence on the selection processes who 
would govern the GDL. This means the absence of external control over internal and 
foreign politics of GDL by Poland. Until the 1569 Union of Lublin, relations of GDL 
with Poland remained those of strategic alliance that was used by the GDL more fre-
quently for its own goals than Poland was able to do.23 The Polish-Lithuanian union 
provided Lithuania with resources to continue eastward imperial expansion for some 
time and then to defend its eastern borders from Moscow.
Although after 1430 the eastward territorial expansion of Lithuania ceased and 
by the 1449 treaty with the Muscovite state Lithuania had resigned from its goal to 
establish hegemony or annex all the lands of the former Kievan Rus’, it never became 
a “peaceful empire” that would conduct only defensive wars. Relevant evidence are 
their attempts at the re-conquest of the eastern territories (first of all, Smolensk) lost 
to Moscow (e.g. “Starodub war” in 1534–1537), to establish its hegemony over Li-
vonia (by the Pasvalys Treaty in 1557) that led to its annexation (in 1561) and the 
Livonian war that could not be won, however, by the GDL forces alone.
What did happen to Lithuanian empire after 1569? Did Kingdom of Poland be-
come empire itself after Southern provinces of GDL were annexed in 1569? Did Po-
land inherit Lithuanian empire? Was Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth an empire? 
Mainstream Polish historiography still avoids these questions or assumes negative 
answer to them. Many Polish historians still suscribe to the famous idea by Oscar 
Halecki of federalism as “Idea Jagiellońska,” embodied in the structure of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth.24 However, there are revisionist authors, with Andrzej 
Nowak perhaps most important among them. Discussing origins of the Russian em-
pire, Nowak maintains: 
most contemporary scholars date the beginning of that empire to 1470s, when Moscow ma-
naged to gain control over and absorbed the enormous, multiethnic territories of the merchant 
republic of Novgorod. [...] Yet it is worth pointing out, that over the previous century it was not 
Moscow, but quite different political centre, that has created a magnificent imperial structure in 
Eastern Europe. It was neither Poland, but Lithuania in fact.25
23 Cp. L. Ko lankowsk i, Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego za Jagiellonów, vol. 1: 1377– 
1499, Warszawa 1930, p. 30.
24 See O. Ha leck i, Idea jagiellońska, Lwów 1937; idem, Imperialism in Slavic and East European 
History, “The American Slavic and East European Reviews” 1952, vol. 11, p. 1–26.
25 A. Nowak, History and Geopolitics. A Contest for Eastern Europe, Warszawa 2008, p. 40.
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What about Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth? In this book, Nowak avoids un-
ambiguous answer to the question whether Rzecz Pospolita was Empire, presenting 
arguments pro et contra. This is perhaps most important “contra” argument: “for 
many critical observers of Polish history, there exists a key to its essence, as uni-
versal as the island-nature of Britain, and the empire status of Russia: it is the term 
‘anarchy.’ Anarchy and empire are terms of furthermost opposition – and not only in 
their Latin roots.”26 So Russia or Muscovy is ideal typical empire, while Poland is the 
very opposite of empire. However, broad comparative social scientific approach may 
help to sensitize historical vision for imperial features of Polish-Lithuanian Com-
monwealth disclosing the full range of variation in imperial rule and experience, 
where Russian empire may be just one limit case, and Holy Roman Empire, which 
lacked most attributes of ideal typical empire by XVIth century, another one.27
2. Gdl as emPIre In tHe HIstorIcal culture  
of tHe I rePublIc of lItHuanIa (1918–1940)
Nowak discusses the question whether the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
was an empire, but avoids unambiguous answer, because he focuses on the fates 
of the empires and imperialism in XIX–XX centuries in his research. They include 
the paradoxical outcome of the failed attempt by great fighter against imperialism 
Józef Piłsudski to create federal state in the territory of former Rzecz Pospolita in 
1918–1920. 
The truncated territory of the old Commonwealth – transformed into the Second Polish Repub-
lic – was to be treated for most of its existence as an ethnic Polish state in the making. This was 
a mini-empire, a regional power, struggling against her two powerful neighbours and their re-
visionist ambitions. If there was anyone approximating to the rank of emperor in contemporary 
Polish history – Piłsudski come the closest to that title.28 
As a matter of fact, the changes in the reputation of empires and imperialism go-
ing back to Westphalia peace treaty in 1648, explain best why historians do not see 
imperial features of some ancient polities at one time, but become perceptive at dif-
ferent times. Since early XIXth century, the word “empire” received negative value 
connotation, meaning the very antithesis of national state, which was final political 
goal of the national movements. The establishment of national state as a “normal 
state” discredited empires as illegitimate and archaic state form. The reputation of 
26 Ibidem, p. 38.
27 Cp. H.-J. Bömelbu rg, Czy Rzeczpospolita była imperium? Imperial turn w historiografii, 
struktury państwowe w Europie Środkowowschodniej i „imperialna” warstwa pojęciowa w XVI– 
–XVII wieku [in:] B. Dybaś, P. Hanczewsky, T. Kempa  (eds.), Rzeczpospolita w XVI–XVIII wieku. 
Państwo czy wspólnota?, Toruń 2007, p. 43–57.
28 A. Nowak, History and Geopolitics, p. 377. 
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empires reached its nadir after World War I, which was represented as the outcome of 
imperialism in socialist, liberal and liberal nationalist discourse communities. 
Empires (not all) had to wait for their (partial) rehabilitation until the demise of 
Soviet polity, which was born in the battle waged to destroy world imperialism, but 
perished as “evil empire.” The demise of “evil empire,” crisis of nationalism and 
national state on the old continent in the wake of the rise of European Union, and glo-
balization supervised by the American “good empire” levelled the ground for the re-
cent rise of comparative imperiology struggling to transform the concepts of empire 
and imperialism into useful analytical tools. The self-image of Lithuania as an eternal 
victim of the rapacious imperialism of neighbouring nations (Russian, German and 
Polish) remains most powerful obstacle for the perception of imperial features of the 
ancient Lithuanian state in the modern Lithuanian historical culture. Similarly, self-
image of Poland as rebellious victim of Russian and German imperialism provides no 
space for ideas of both Rzecz Pospolita I and Rzecz Pospolita II as empires, or for an 
idea of Polish imperialism in the social imaginary of modern Polish nation.29 
But of course, Grand Duchy of Lithuania was important, if not central subject in 
the historical culture of modern Lithuania. This may be explained by the extraordi-
nary role of the memories about the greatness of ancient Lithuania in the making of 
modern Lithuania. Even by now, these memories remain important part of the mod-
ern Lithuanian identity. Most popular Lithuanian male names still are those of the an-
cient rulers GDL – Vytautas, Algirdas, Kęstutis, Mindaugas, with remarkable excep-
tion for Jogaila, which is much less popular. The very first strophe of the Lithuanian 
anthem, written by one of “fathers” of modern Lithuanian nation Vincas Kudirka 
(1858–1899) refers to great ancient past of Lithuania as inspiration source for mod-
ern Lithuanians: “Lithuania, our homeland, Land of heroes! Let your sons draw their 
strength from our past experience.” The glory of the ancient Lithuanian state along 
with the reputation of Lithuanian language as one of the most archaic and therefore 
preserving most features of the extinct Proto-Indo-European language, were among 
those few anchors which could be used by the literates busy to “awaken” national 
consciousness of the indigenous populations of the Kowno, Wilna and Suwałki gov-
ernments of Russian empire between 1883–1918.
Most popular historical texts in Lithuanian, published during this time of Lithu-
anian “national awakening” in 1883–1918 provide proud account not only about the 
victories of ancient Lithuanian rulers in the defensive war against Teutonic Order, 
but also about their military and diplomatic action in the Rus’ lands, culminating in 
the creation of the biggest (in terms of its territory) European polity by the time of 
Lithuanian baptism in 1387.30 Its extension from Baltic to Black seas and apocryphal 
story about the Vytautas and his warriors entering the water of Black sea on the backs 
29 See A. Nowak  (ed.), Ofiary imperium. Imperia jako ofiary. 44 spojrzenia, Warszawa 2010.
30 See J. Mač iu l i s -Ma i ron i s  [Š. M-lis], Lietuvos istorija: su kunigaikščių paveikslais ir žemlapiu, 
parašė Maironis (Š. M-lis). 3-ią kartą atspausta ir partaisyta, Petropilis 1906; A. A lekna, Lietuvos 
istorija, Kaunas 1911; On the early modern national history writing see: A. G ieda, Istoriografija ir 
visuomenė: istorika, istoriko profesijos ir istorinės kultūros aspektai Lietuvoje 1904–1940 m., daktaro 
disertacija, humanitariniai mokslai, istorija (05 H), Vilnius 2013. 
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of their horses are usual elements of these accounts. However, the words “imperial-
ism” or “empire” were not used to describe eastward expansion of ancient Lithuanian 
polity or its outcomes in the historical literature published in Lithuanian before 1929. 
In this year Kazys Pakštas (1893–1960), Professor of Geography at the Vytautas 
Magnus university in Kaunas, who has graduated in sociology from Fordham univer-
sity (U.S.) in 1918 and defended doctoral dissertation in geography at the Fribourg 
university in Swiss (1923), published chapter by chapter in the magazin “Židinys” 
monograph Baltijos respublikų politinė geografija [Political Geography of Baltic 
States], which appeared as book publication next year. In the 5th section of the 5th 
chapter “Lietuvių genijaus dispersija ir ateities perspektyva [The dispersion and fu-
ture perspective of Lithuanian genius]”31 he argued that the name of “Grand Duchy” 
is misnomer for ancient Lithuanian polity. “It is misunderstanding to call Lithuania 
of the time of Vytautas Magnus ‘Grand Duchy.’ Its territory and dignity completely 
corresponded to the name and dignity of great empire.”32 
Pakštas was pioneer of geopolitics in Lithuania. So he provided mainly politi-
cal geographical arguments to support his statement. According to K. Pakštas, most 
important distinguishing feature of (continental) empire is territorial extension from 
sea to sea. “In contemporary Europe, there are only two states extending from sea to 
sea: Russia and France. Small, i. e. not numerous Lithuanian people did create empire 
a mare usque ad marem, doing this in the most broad place of the continent.”33 He 
elaborated his thesis by metropole/peripheries distinction by comparisons: “Vilnius, 
ethnographic Lithuania, was an embryo for huge Lithuanian empire, whose periph-
eries were many Slavic polities in the East and South. For Russia such embryo was 
duchy of Moscow, for Germany – Brandenburg, for France – I’lle de France, for Spain 
– Castille.”34 Pakštas came back to topic in his later publications, providing some new 
observations. “The empire of Vytautas Magnus is most remarkable and unique crea-
tion in the world, as far as small pagan people ruled over big Christian colonies, while 
in all world history we everywhere see only the opposite phenomena.”35 Writing in 
emigration (U.S.), Pakštas summarized his argument in the article on the territory and 
borders of Lithuanian state, published in the 15th volume of the Lietuvių enciklopedija 
[Encyclopaedia of Lithuanians].36 
Pakštas’ ideas were most probable source of inspiration for numerous digres-
sions on GDL as empire in the speeches by Lithuanian President Antanas Smeto-
na (1874–1944). In 1930, Lithuania commemorated 500 years anniversary of the 
Vytautas Magnus death. Nationalist (tautininkai) regime, which was established in 
31 K. Pakš t a s, Lietuvių genijaus dispersija ir ateities perspektyvos, “Židinys”1929, vol. 12, 
p. 434–440.
32 Idem, Baltijos respublikų politinė geografija, p. 181–182. 
33 Ibidem. 
34 Ibidem, p. 197.
35 K. Pakš t a s, Lietuva Eikumenos erdvėje [in:] Idem, Kultūra, civilizacija, geopolitika, Vilnius 
2003, p. 227.
36 Idem, Lietuvos valstybės plotai ir sienos, “Lietuvių enciklopedija” 1968 (Boston), vol. 15, 
p. 452–454.
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Lithuania after 1926 state coup, used the jubilee celebration to consolidate itself and 
to strengthen the Smetona’s personal authority.37 Lithuanian dictator gave numerous 
speeches, referring to GDL as empire on at least four different occasions. “Empire 
of Vytautas was strong wall, behind which Western countries could live more quite 
life and cultivate the civilization inherited from the Rome.”38 Pakštas’ influence is 
revealed by the Smetona’s repetition of the geopolitical argument about the extension 
from sea to sea as the most sure mark of the imperial stature of GDL.
Along with Pakštas work, another probable source of inspiration for Smetona was 
the book Didysis Lietuvos kunigaikštis Vytautas kaip politikas [Grand Duke of Lithu-
ania Vytautas as politician] by Professor of medieval and Eastern European history at 
the German University of Prague Josef Pfitzner. This book was published in 1929 as 
Grossfürst Witold von Litauen als Staatsmann and already next year was translated into 
Lithuanian. Although Pfitzner did not use the word “empire,” he wrote with admiration 
about Vytautas expansionist policies in the East. Pftizner trusted the information of the 
Nikonian Chronicle about the alleged Vytautas’ plans to put under his rule the whole 
world (!) in 1399, i. e. on the eve of Vorskla battle. “Here the plans of the universal rule 
(universale Weltherrschaftspläne) are clearly seen, because he saw himself to be God’s 
appointed ruler of all the lands, and a Horde Khan had to obey him.”39 
The reference to GDL as empire in Smetona’s speech was no accident, which can 
be explained by special circumstances, because the term recurs after the anniversary 
year 1930. Smetona described ancient Lithuanian polity as empire in later speeches 
delivered on various occasions in 1932, 1933, 1934 and 1937. Importantly, Smetona 
was no simple circulator of Pakštas’ and Pftizner’s ideas. Instead, he provided his 
own, much more nuanced and differentiating discussion of the ancient Lithuanian 
imperialism. Of course, in his speeches Smetona never forgot to make provision that 
being proud of its imperial past, modern Lithuania has not a slightest intention to 
pursue imperialist politics: “We are proud of Algirdas and Vytautas politics, but we 
do not attempt to act in their way. The time is different, and we are different.”40 What 
does this difference mean? „Free Lithuania is only a small piece of ancient huge 
state. It is pity, that we are so small. However, we rejoice that we are free again and 
understand how to be progressive.”41
Celebrating ancient Lithuanian empire, Smetona at the same time attacked policies 
of former (Tsarist) Russia and modern Poland as imperialist. Polish imperialism caused 
the uncured wound of modern Lithuania: loss of Vilnius. Smetona argued that differ-
ently from Lithuanian nationalism, Polish nationalism was “imperialist nationalism.ˮ 
He explains this concept, describing policies of Polish administrations towards local 
37 See D. Mač iu l i s, Valstybės kultūros politika Lietuvoje 1927–1940 metais, Vilnius 2005. 
38 A. Sme tona, Vasario 16 d. minint. Įsakymas kariuomenei 1930.02.16, Nr 11 [in:] Idem, Pasakyta 
parašyta, Kaunas 1935, p. 158–159. 
39 J. P f i cne r i s, Didysis Lietuvos kunigaikštis Vytautas kaip politikas, Kaunas 1930, p. 205.
40 A. Sme tona, Jaunieji vyresniųjų viltis. Kalba jaunalietuviams, 1935.05.11 [in:] Idem, Pasakyta 
parašyta, vol. 2: 1935–1940, Boston 1974, p. 240.
41 Idem, Protėvių kultūra dabarčiai reikšminga. Kalba Senovės Dieną Dauguose, 1937.06.20 [in:] 
Idem, Pasakyta parašyta, vol. 2: 1935–1940, p. 350.
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population of Vilnius region: “Poland preaches for the Polishness, like missionaries 
are preaching religion. So Polish nationalism is imperialist, because it uses alien eth-
nographic material to enlarge own nation in order to marginalize conscious Lithuanian 
element.”42 In his attack on Polish “imperialistic nationalism,” Smetona appeals to the 
right of self-determination of nations proclaimed in famous 14 points by Woodrow 
Wilson on 08.01.1918: 
Poles appealed to Wilson’s law, when they creted and built their state. [...] If so, then Poles 
should understand Lithuanians and recognize for them the same right of self-determination 
which they claimed for themselves. So they should abandon imperialist nationalism with re-
spect to Lithuania.43 
How it is possible to be proud of the Lithuanian imperial past (or “magnificent im-
perial structure,” in Andrzej Nowak’s words) and to attack contemporary Polish impe-
rialism (real or alleged)? Did not ancient Lithuania did the same for its neighbours what 
it suffers now from Poland? Smetona was conscious of the problem. Interestingly, he 
did not use historicist strategy of relativizing validity of international law and morality 
for different epochs. Instead, he draws the distinction between two kinds of national-
ism: statist imperialism (valstybiškas nacionalizmas in Lithuanian) and nationalist (or 
imperialist) nationalism.44 Although ancient Lithuanians pursued territorial expansion, 
they did not attempt the assimilation of the indigenous populations, using them as “eth-
nographic material.” Rather, they served themselves as such material, while contempo-
rary Polish nationalist imperialism does exactly the opposite. 
Lithuanian empire, created by Lithuanian genius, was important factor of peace in the medieval 
Europe, so it has big merits for civilization by countering rapacious predators. Russians then 
received from Lithuanians more than Lithuanians took from Moscow and Kiev. Building po-
werful state, great leaders of Lithuania melted in the broad space its best forces, lost to Slaves 
aristocracy and nobility. Lithuanian nation is now similar to tree, stripped of leaves by the 
winds and with branches broken by storms.45 
Because ancient Lithuania in its imperialist expansion gave more (“ethnograph-
ic material”) than received (nothing), the empire was mixed blessing. The building 
of empire maybe provided additional resources for the defense of Western borders 
against Teutonic order. But in the long-term perspective the miserable state of con-
temporary Lithuania may be caused by its overextension accompanied by the disper-
sion of Lithuanian elite among the ruled populations. 
Who knows, maybe ancient Lithuania perished because of the expansion. Contemporary expe-
riences also confirm the fear of this danger. Many our intellectuals (inteligentų), dispersed 
among aliens and taking in mixed marriages, assimilated themselves and educated assimilated 
children.46 
42 Idem, Lietuvių tauta ir jos paskirtis, paskaita Politinių ir Socialinių Mokslų Institute, 1936.03.24; 
Idem, Pasakyta parašyta, vol. 2: 1935–1940, p. 56. 
43 Ibidem, p. 57.
44 See ibidem, p. 60. 
45 A. Sme tona, Nebaigtoji byla. Įvadas A. Smetonos Raštų 4-am tomui ’Lietuvių santykiai su 
lenkais.‘ 1930.12.17 [in:] Idem, Raštai, vol. 4: Atgimstant, Kaunas 1931, p. V.
46 Idem, Lietuvio žymės [in:] Idem, Raštai, vol. 1: Vienybės gairėmis, Kaunas 1930, p. 107.
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So present miserable state of Lithuanian nation is caused by its ancient great-
ness. Smetona elaborated this early insight in his later text “Lithuanian nation and its 
mission” (Lietuvių tauta ir jos paskirtis). Here one can find most detailed exposition 
of his views on ancient Lithuanian imperialism. 
Smetona blamed political leadership of GDL in XV–XVIth centuries for failure to 
achieve the synthesis of Eastern and Western cultures that allegedly was successfully 
started by Vytautas but was not continued by his less able successors. The idea that 
synthesis of Western and Eastern cultures is the historical “mission” of Lithuania 
was advanced by the Lithuanian philosopher Stasys Šalkauskis in the book Sur les 
confins des deux mondes, published in 1919.47 This is how Smetona takes stand on 
Šalkauskis’ idea: 
When Lithuania in his defense against German orders was compelled to search for stronger 
support in Slavic lands, when it allowed alien elements to penetrate state organism, then it 
needed to coordinate them, recognizing the principles of different cultures. Their synthesis 
was the important task for the Vytautas the Great who extended the borders of the state very 
far to the East and South. We know his attempt to shield his Orthodox subordinates from 
Moscow influence by giving them separate metropoly. On the other hand, he was in a hurry 
to make pagan Lithuania Catholic. His sympathy for Roman Church is evident, because he 
understood that the light of civilization from the West is more useful for Lithuania, than that 
from the East. However, Vytautas regulated the relation between two cultures by the law of 
justice. This means that he understood how to produce true synthesis, and therefore Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania could live from the fruits of his policy for centuries. If this expansive po-
litics overshadowed Lithuanian element in the long run, the blame lays on those who after his 
death were responsible for the fate of Lithuania. Ultimately, Lithuanian expansion damaged 
Lithuanians themselves, and Poland understood how to make profit on it. In contemporary 
words, we should designate this as Lithuanian imperialism, but a statist and not a nationalist 
one (šiandienine terminologija tai pavadintume lietuvių imperializmu, tik ne nacionalistišku, 
o valstybišku).48 
This rather mild criticism of ancient Lithuanian “statist imperialism” by Sme-
tona was radicalized by one of the leading ideologists of the ruling Nationalist 
(Tautininkai) party, Vytautas Alantas (1902–1990), who in 1934–1939 was the edi-
tor of the semi-official Lithuanian newspaper “Lietuvos aidas.” Alantas outrightly 
rejected the idea of Šalkauskis, which received some credit from Smetona (but 
only for ancient, not modern Lithuania) that historical mission of Lithuania is to 
achieve the synthesis of Eastern and Western cultures. Instead, Lithuania should 
just develop its cultural individuality and defend its political independence, as all 
“normal” nations do. 
Just on the eve of Soviet occupation in 1940, Alantas published the collection of 
his essays Žygiuojanti tauta [Nation on March],49 where he elaborated on the reflec-
tions of Antanas Smetona about the imperial past of Lithuania. Along with Pakštas, 
Alantas continued discourse on the ancient Lithuanian imperialism in the emigration, 
47 See S. Ša lkausk i s, Sur les confins de deux mondes. Essai synthétique sur le Probleme de la 
civilisation nationale en Lithuanie, Genève 1919. 
48 A. Sme tona, Lietuvių tauta ir jos paskirtis, p. 60. 
49 V. A lan t a s, Žygiuojanti tauta, Kaunas 1990.
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joined by some junior authors.50 The particular outgrowth of this discourse is par-
ahistorical conception of Baltic Empire by Česlovas Gedgaudas (1909–1986).51 In 
the emigration, Alantas mainly wrote fiction.52 However, shortly before the restoration 
of Lithuanian independence and his own death, another collection of Alantas’ essays 
in “nationalist ideology” (tautininkų ideologija) was published. In these late texts, the 
idea of ancient Lithuania as victim of his own imperial expansion in particular receive 
pride of place in his reflection on the place of GDL in the Lithuanian history.53
Main points in Alantas elaboration in the Smetona’s incipient criticism of the 
ancient Lithuanian imperialism are: (1) Ancient Lithuanians were too tolerant and 
generous for their subordinates and neighbours. 
Who does not knows that Lithuania was exceptionally generous in its history? We gave for our 
neighbours the dynasties of kings and dukes, and gave in such a way how nobody else gives: 
when Lithuanian dynasts departed from Lithuania, they took pieces of territory with themsel-
ves. And Jogaila departing almost ruined whole Lithuanian empire. We were powerful and rich, 
but because of our exceptional generosity we gave away our power and wealth for others.54 
(2) Ruling dynasty betrayed Lithuanian state by identifying with alien (Polish) 
state. In the later (emigration) writings, he supplements these points with another 
consideration. (3) Instead of eastward imperial expansion, Lithuanian rulers should 
struggle for unification of Baltic tribes. Alantas maintains that under XXth century 
conditions a nation should have at least 10 million members to be viable for a longer 
time.55 The unification of all or most of Baltic tribes in one state would open the 
chance for such development, while in its Eastern expansion Lithuanians just “do-
nated” themselves as ethnographic material for alien imperial projects, with Poland 
benefiting most from its Lithuanian donor. 
Interestingly, last criticism of Alantas was anticipated in part by A. Smetona him-
self. In one his speeches, Lithuanian President rebuked the rulers of ancient Lithuania 
for their abandonment of the task to secure the access to Baltic sea in favour of the 
continental expansion. 
Lithuanian Empire was extended from Baltic to Black seas in the ancient times. We are proud 
that it was such. Lithuanians defended the sea costs, but were not able to preserve their rights 
on the sea, to create their own fleet and launch their own free trade. Probably because of this fa-
ilure, the huge Empire perished and the nation barely survived, divided and exhausted. Now we 
understand our mistakes (and maybe the sins!) and want to correct them, we want repent. Lit-
huanians will not spare any sacrifices to protect and defend their maritime rights.56 
50 See A.M. Budreck i s, Algirdas. Senovės Lietuvos valstybininkas, jo veikla ir laikai, New York 
1981.
51 See Č. Gedgaudas, Mūsų praeities beieškant, Mexico 1972, 2nd ed., 1992.
52 His output includes numerous novels and plays, among them historical novel on Mindaugas times, 
Šventaragis (2 vol., 1972–1974). 
53 See V. A lan ta s, Tauta istorijos vingiais: ideologiniai mąstymai, Chicago 1990.
54 Idem, Žygiuojanti tauta, p. 38.
55 Idem, Tauta istorijos vingiais, p. 220.
56 A. Sme tona, Jūros diena. Kalba, pasakyta 1934.08.12 Klaipėdoje per jūros dieną [in:] Idem, 
Pasakyta parašyta, p. 297–298.
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So indifference to sea in general and to Baltic sea in particular was fatal mistake 
if not sin of ancient Lithuania rulers.
The focus on the “mistakes” and “sins” of the builders of the ancient Lithuanian 
empire can be explained by the occasion and time of this speech. It was delivered in 
Klaipėda on the August 12th, 1934 during the newly introduced national feast-day to 
celebrate the “recovery” of Klaipėda/Memel. Smetona’s goal was to communicate 
the resolve of Lithuania to defend Klaipėda against German revanchism. Exactly at 
this time, Lithuania was involved in the conflict in the Germany after the arrest by 
Lithuanian police of the leaders and activists of Nazist organizations. With no support 
from Western powers, which demanded to respect the “rights of German minority,” 
Lithuania lost. After 1937, there are no more references to GDL as empire in Smeto-
na’s speeches. With Lithuania becoming real victim of the imperialism of its stronger 
neighbours, there were less and less occasions to commemorate and celebrate ancient 
Lithuanian empire.
But what was the political message and function of the repeated use of the “em-
pire” in the Smetona’s speeches during the “brighter” times 1930–1937? Smetona 
was perfectly conscious about the ambivalence of the value load of “empire,” and 
occasionaly voiced hopes about the future world where there will be no imperialism.
As represented by great powers in colonies, it [imperialism. – Z.N.] is now double-faced: natio-
nalist and cosmopolitan. It has too narrow space in Europe, it is no more possible here. If one 
or another state without colonies moves here around and tries to expand at the cost of weaker 
neighbours, this may the last attempt. The time will come when colonies will demand from 
metropoles their certificates of education. And then there will be the crisis of imperialism. But 
this time is still in so far away future, and there is no point to disseminate the pictures of this 
future, because most of the colonies still are on the low level of civilization.57 
In the search for political functions of the memory of empire in the interwar Lith-
uania, which was small, weak, poor and underdeveloped state, the observation may 
be helpful that ancient Lithuanian empire is almost always associated with Vytautas, 
and usually called “Vytautas empire.” This association is far from obvious, because 
Gediminas and Algirdas were real empire builders. Jogaila contributed most for its 
stabilization by union with Poland, and remained legal suzerain of Vytautas untill 
his death. So why then “Vytautas empire,” but not “Gediminas empire,” “Algirdas 
empire” or “Jogaila empire”? 
Importantly, Vytautas’ struggle for his share of power before 1392 was perceived 
in the interwar Lithuania as fight for independence from Poland, paralleling the 
independence struggles of 1918–1921. In this struggles Lithuania had several en-
emies. One of them was Józef Piłsudski with his programme to restore Polish-Lithua-
nian federation with Lithuania as junior partner. So the real major Lithuanian ancient 
“imperialist” in late XIV–early XVth century Jogaila had bad luck to be associated 
with another “traitor”58 – Józef Piłsudski, and marginalized in Lithuanian historical 
memories. In its turn, the cult of Vytautas Magnus in the interwar Lithuania became 
57 A. Sme tona, Lietuvių tauta ir jos paskirtis, p. 60. 
58 Because of ethnically Lithuanian origins of the Naczelnik Państwa.
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Fig. 1. Monument for Vytautas 
Magnus in Kaunas. Picture by 
author. 
part of the cult of the Antanas Smetona, who was represented as a major hero in the 
fight for creation of independent Lithuanian state, repeating Vytautas feat in the late 
XIVth century. In the struggle for independent Lithuania, both Smetona and Vytautas 
temporary “collaborated” with another “historical enemy” – Germans.
Most impressive visual representation of the idea of GDL as empire in the in-
terwar Lithuanian historical culture was monument to Vytautas Magnus by Lithu-
anian sculptor Vincas Grybas (1890–1941). It was erected in 1932 Panemunė, at 
the gate Lithuanian military school. Destroyed in the Soviet time, it was re-erected 
in the downtown Kaunas in Laisvės alėja street in 1990. Part of the monument are 
images of 4 warriors, representing powers vanquished by Vytautas. Along with Ger-
man, Russian, and Tatar captives, one finds a Polish knight, although Vytautas never 
fought a war against Poland, at least a victorious one.59 How to explain the presence 
of a Pole? 
59 Except as ally of Teutonic Order during civil war in GDL in 1389–1392.
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The comments by Giedrė Mickūnaitė on Vytautas monument in Kaunas suggest 
the explanation why memories about “Vytautas empire” were so important in the 
Lithuanian historical imaginary of interwar times. 
The Vytautas monument, composed of vanquished warriors, not only recapitulates in short hi-
storical truths, but also affirms political aspirations of the interwar time. The victories of Vytau-
tas against Russian duchies, Tatar hordes, Teutonic order are well-known historical fact. Howe-
ver, not Vytautas but interwar Lithuania were ‘in the war’ with Poland.60 
Tellingly, at his original location in Panemunė, Vytautas “looked” to Vilnius side. 
So the celebration of the “Vytautas empire” both communicated the will and nour-
ished the hope to regain Vilnius against all odds, as Vytautas managed to win in 
the seemingly hopeless situations against the adversaries not less formidable than 
Piłsudski’s Poland.
Despite the important, if not central place of “Vytautas empire” in the historical 
memory of interwar Lithuania, the word “empire” was only occasionally used in the 
work of the Lithuanian professional historians, and never was applied as analytical 
category structuring the historical interpretation. “Empire” does not occur neither in 
the collective work Vytautas Didysis (1930) edited by Paulius Šležas, nor in famous 
History of Lithuania edited by Adolfas Šapoka (1936).61 Most plausible explanation 
for this persistent neglect of the digressions of the “leader of nation” (tautos vadas) 
on GDL as empire was the dominance the “historist” or “hermeneutical” methodolo-
gy. Hermeneutics obliges an historian to remain as close to the language and concepts 
of his sources as possible, explaining and understanding a “historical individuum” in 
its own time and place. From this viewpoint, the Pakštas/Smetona’s thesis about GDL 
as empire was just a dilettante oxymoron, because “obviously” even a grand duchy 
is less than kingdom, and kingdom is less than empire. In other words, GDL was not 
empire, because no contemporary observers perceived or designated it as such. 
3. Gdl as empire in the historical culture of the II republic of lithuania 
In the Soviet historical literature on GDL, no matter whether it was produced in 
Lithuania, Moscow, or other Soviet republics, GDL was never described as empire, 
and its expansion into Slavic lands was not designated as imperialism. According 
to Soviet Marxism-Leninism, which was obligatory for all “publishable” output of 
historians, imperialism was “highest and last stage of capitalism.” So it was generally 
avoided in the writings about the historical epochs preceding late XIXth century. But 
even if occasionally used beyond the modern history context, “empire” and “impe-
rialism” had very strong negative emotive meaning in the Marxist-Leninist vocabu-
lary. Therefore, the designation of Algirdas and Vytautas as imperialists and GDL as 
empires would be tantamount to their condemnation as “reactionary.” If this would 
60 G. Mickūna i t ė, Vytautas Didysis. Valdovo įvaizdis, Vilnius 2008, p. 15.
61 Of course, there are exceptions, represented by the casual uses in the writings by Ignas Jonynas 
and Simas Sužiedėlis, written for broader readership. 
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happen, say, under Stalin’s time, then many good Lithuanian communists would be 
under pressure to change their own and their sons’ given names.
However, nobody was interested in the re-interpretation of ancient Lithuanian 
history, causing so much inconvenience. In the Tsarist Russia, GDL was described 
as the “Western Russian state,” which before the fateful Krėva treaty was just an-
other center for unification of Russian lands. In this framework, GDL as empire was 
not conceivable, because Russians could not be imperialists subjugating fellow Rus-
sians. In the Soviet historiography, it was acknowledged that GDL was created by 
non-Slavic Lithuanian people and ruled by the non-Russian rulers. They were praised 
for their fight against Germans, and rather mildly rebuked for the expansion into 
Slavic lands. In the 1970s, Lithuanian historians even made cautious attempt to “re-
habilitate” this expansion by representing it as a part of “struggle of peoples against 
Golden Horde,”62 which was true “evil empire” for Soviet historians.
In the restored independent Lithuania, the discourse on GDL as empire was resur-
rected by Gintaras Beresnevičius (1961.07.07–2006.08.06). He was leading Lithu-
anian scholar in religion studies, specializing in pre-Christian Baltic mythology – 
a kind of Lithuanian Mircea Eliade. Like Alantas, he also published novels, poems, 
and numerous essays. In 2003, he published the book “Making of Empire” (Imperijos 
darymas).63 This was an exploratory study of the prospects of Lithuanian foreign pol-
icy after joining EU and NATO, commissioned by Institute of International Relations 
and Political Science of Vilnius university, which was “brain trust” of Lithuanian 
presidency in the time when Valdas Adamkus was in office (1998–2003, 2004–2009). 
Similarly to interwar times, the surfacing of the idea of GDL as empire was not 
the outcome of the academic scholarly efforts to provide new interpretation of the 
GDL history by illuminating known historical facts. Rather, “imperial” view of GDL 
was used to affirm political aspirations. In the May 2000, during the meeting of the 
ministers of foreign affairs of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, a group of countries applying for member-
ship in NATO was established. After it was joined by Croatia, it was called “Vilnius 
10” group. At this time, Lithuanian politicians felt that Lithuania is very important 
country. They were eager to make permanent their self-assumed and self-perceived 
role of the leader of the New (post-Communist) West – even if there were few (if any) 
neighbour countries which recognized Lithuania in such role. Lithuanian intellectuals 
were expected to provide ideas how rulers of modern contemporary Lithuania could 
use the real or imagined opportunity to upgrade Lithuania’s international status. 
Meeting this expectation, Beresnevičius advanced grandiose vision of the mis-
sion of Lithuania after joining EU and NATO. He invited to use membership in these 
international organizations as an opportunity “to make the empire.” Accoding to 
62 R. Ba tū ra, Lietuva tautų kovoje prieš Aukso Ordą. Nuo Batu antplūdžio iki mūšio prie Mėlynųjų 
Vandenų, Vilnius 1975.
63 G. Be re snev ič iu s, Imperijos darymas. Lietuviškos ideologijos metmenys. Europos Sąjunga 
ir Lietuvos geopolitika XXI a. pirmoje pusėje [Making of Empire. An Outline of Lithuanian Ideology. 
European Union and Geopolitics of Lithuania in the first half of XXI century], Vilnius 2003; http://www.
dangus.net/nc51.htm (access: 26.11.2013).
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Beresnevičius, this means becoming the bridgehead and vanguard of the eastward 
extension of EU and NATO. More specifically, this means the spearheading the ex-
port of democracy in the former republics of USSR. “We have opportunity to use 
current situation to lay foundation for our own geopolitical bloc, tectonic bloc, to 
restore GDL.”64 The “restoration of GDL” would mean the creation of some kind of 
community of nations including not only states in the former terrritory of GDL, but 
also Transcaucasian and even Central Asian countries, something distantly similar to 
British Commonwealth of Nations. “We must enter EU as democratic empire, by act-
ing in the spaces which possibly will exceed the territory of EU itself.”65 
Differently from Smetona, Beresnevičius does not associate ancient Lithuanian 
empire with Vytautas and pays no attention to the topic of the cost of imperial expan-
sion, which was so important for Alantas. Even more importantly, ancient Lithuanian 
empire is not synonymous for Beresnevičius with GDL. He takes seriuosly parahis-
torical theories about active participation of Baltic tribes in the events of “Barbar-
ian invasions” or “Völkerwanderung” period 200–600 A.D., with the breakdown of 
Western Roman empire as its most important world historical outcome. Therefore, in 
the parts of his text, which refer to ancient times, he avoids exact dates and prefers 
general descriptions where the realities of IIIrd–VIth centuries are anachronistically 
mixed with those of XIIIth–XVth centuries. In this way, the emergence of GDL is rep-
resented as continuation of the “empire making” activities by the ethnic ancestors of 
modern Lithuanians in the much earlier times. 
This citation may provide the impression how Beresnevičius proceeds. 
As the tillers always prevail in numbers, ruling military nobility takes over their language and 
culture. If this culture is higher, than higher culture is absorbed, if lower – then lower one. This 
is what adaptation means. Lithuanians behaved themselves in exactly same way, how Norman, 
Gothic or Langobard dukes did. The difference is that they did not disappear, and they did not 
disappear because they had unitary ethnic base. Ethnic Lithuania. If this ethnic base would have 
moved and arrrived say to lower Dnieper or lower Volga, they would have disappeared ruling 
somewhere in Kiev or Sarai. On the very summit of their domination. Barbarians, which have 
created Europe, did finish their histories in such way. Lithuanians are unique among barbarians 
who have participated in the Migration of Peoples, who have preserved their ties with old fat-
herland, and therefore this base has survived.66 
Surviving in their ancient motherland, Lithuanians remain the same “eternal Bar-
barians” from Völkerwanderung times, which are well only when they act according 
to their perennial imperial drive, being in their own element. Otherwise, they perform 
acts of self-destruction or those of criminal activity.
Obviously, such essentialistic view has nothing in common with scholarly his-
torical or social scientific analysis. However, Beresnevičius’ goal is not to provide 
academic analysis, but to construct political myth useful for the contemporary power 
elite of Lithuania that would inspire its citizens to bear the costs in playing the self-
assumed role of the vanguard of the Eastern expansion of NATO and EU. In this role, 
64 Ibidem, p. 72.
65 Ibidem, p. 7. 
66 Ibidem, p. 11–12.
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Lithuania would challenge semi-authoritarian Russia, continuing the policy which 
was started in 2000 by Lithuanian Seimas’ legislation which obliged Russia as the 
legal succesor of USSR to compensate the damage caused to Lithuania by some 
50 years of Soviet occupation. There is no hope that present government of Rus-
sia will ever satisfy Lithuanian demands. Therefore, Lithuanian political elites per-
ceive the democratization of Russia as direct interest of Lithuania, as it would mean 
the installation in Moscow of the goverment more pliant to Lithuanian demands. 
In the struggle for this goal, Lithuania should work decreasing ring by ring the 
space which Moscow still tries to keep under its control. 
Europe needs our empire, I think U.S. needs it too – both powers will not need much time to 
understand this, and all their actions show that they understand. [...] Ukraine, Belorus should be 
with our help culturally and politically – immediately – integrated into Central Europe; this is 
the space of GDL; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia should be considered in the exactly same way. 
Next ring – Central Asia, going up to China.67 
How (if at all) this breath-taking vision can be implemented practically? Are the 
resources of small Lithuania not too meager? 
Obviously, it cannot be implemented by the same means, which were used by 
ancient Lithuanian rulers, or those which help U.S. to control the foreign policy of 
so many states around the world without using military power. Practical measures 
proposed by Beresnevičius include, firstly, the creating of Lithuanian Legion. This is 
an elite military task force, which military command of NATO would free to employ 
in all “hot spots” of the world. The beneficial side-effect of this measure would be re-
duction of criminality in Lithuania. The legion “would absorb all potential criminals, 
depressed persons, addicts. If we will have Lithuanian legion, [...] then the dream of 
each adolescent school-boy will not be how to become car thief or drug dealer, but 
a soldier.”68 
Secondly, Beresnevičius proposed to establish the program of stipends and grants 
for students, scholars and intellectuals from Belarus’, Ukraina and other prospective 
members of the restituted GDL. “All this costs, but the cost is comparatively small. 
All this is investition into cultivating of our ‘agents’ in these countries. All states 
which have political interests and perceive them, have similar foundations, fellow-
ship programs. They shape their images from inside by hands of future journalists, 
programmers, statesmen.”69 In competition with other powers eager to “grow up” 
their own “fifth column” in the former Soviet republics, Lithuania has two advan-
tages. As a small state, it cannot be perceived as real threat (even by Russia). Then it 
can exploit the memories of the common victimhood, shared with populations of the 
most Soviet republics. 
Curiously, Beresnevičius has nothing to say about the hotly discussed “division” 
of the GDL legacy between Belorus and contemporary Lithuania. One also finds no 
explanation in his text, how breathtaking program of the restoration of GDL can be 
67 Ibidem, p. 75.
68 Ibidem, p. 56. 
69 Ibidem, p. 16–17.
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harmonized with the aspirations of Poland to foster the heritage of Commonwealth in 
former “kresy,” including the territory of the modern Lithuania itself. This omission 
is puzzling not only because of much more greater economic and political power of 
contemporary Poland in comparison with Lithuania. The aspirations of Poland have 
real basis due to presence of numerous and politically active Polish minority in Be-
larus, Ukraina and Lithuania itself, while contemporary Lithunia has no such agency 
of its influence in the former GDL lands.
Third proposal is at the same time the most cheap and the most difficult to im-
plement. This is the change of the perception of emigration from Lithuania. Since 
the restoration of the independence of Lithuania, its population decreased from 
3,7 million in 1989 to 3,5 million found by general census in 2001, i.e. at the time 
when Beresnevičius launched his program of the restoration of GDL. This decrease 
was co-caused by mortality rates exceeding mortality rates since 1994, but the emi-
gration is major cause. These demographic changes became the matter of general 
concern aroung the year 2000. Advancing his program of “restitution” of GDL, 
Beresnevičius made bold proposal to perceive present emigration as continuation of 
perennial trend since Völkerwanderung times, driving Lithuanian imperial expan-
sion. 
So present Lithuanian emigrants should be considered as “colonists,” spearhead-
ing latest wave of “imperial” expansion. Emigrant quarters in the cities of the ad-
vanced Western countries are equivalents of the military colonies planted by the an-
cient Lithuanian rulers in the Slavic lands. 
We should not perceive emigration as catastrophe, because contemporary world context and 
internal movement in the European Union universalizes these problems. [...]. We should not 
impose on emigration the self-consciousness of ‘lost generation,’ ‘broken thread,’ because in 
this way we can infuse into our diaspora with the complex – to break away and do not come 
back. Jewish diaspora can set the example for our our diaspora, as far as Israel would not be 
a superpower with its territory.70
By 2013, none from these proposals were implemented. As partial exception may 
be considered the project to ground the Institute of Advanced Studies in Vilnius, 
where academics form Central and Eastern European countries would be invited to 
spend a sabbatical year. Some preparatory work on this project was done in 2006– 
–2007. However, it was aborted after the outbreak of economic crisis in Lithuania in 
2008. Another cause may be the election of Dalia Grybauskaitė as President of Lithu-
ania in 2009. After she started (unsuccessful) attempt to improve Lithuania’s rela-
tions with Russia, the idea of “restitution” of GDL lost support in President’s Office 
and Foreign office. Lithuanian armed forces participated in the American unilateral 
military actions in Afganistan and Iran, as well as in the peacekeeping operations of 
NATO. However, Lithuania did not make attempt to surpass other allies of U.S. by 
the zeal in sharing its burden of the sole remaining world superpower as well as its 
imperial glory. Last general census in 2011 disclosed further reduction of the popu-
lation of Lithuania, which was 3 million in this year, and continues to decrease. In 
70 Ibidem, p. 17.
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these circumstances, even for the political establishment of contemporary Lithuania 
it is increasingly difficult to follow the invitation of Beresnevičius to celebrate the 
emigration as the continuation of the imperial expansion of the ancient Lithuania.
Although few people in contemporary Lithuania would endorse the political my-
thology of the “restoration of GDL” in the Beresnevičius sense, his numerous pub-
lications in the most popular internet portals disseminated the idea that GDL was an 
empire in the broader public. The same effect had the book of British historian, now 
working in Lithuania, Stephen C. Rowell.71 Although he did not use imperiological 
framework for the comparative analysis of GDL, the very designation of GDL as 
empire in the title of the book had accustomed Lithuanian readers to the idea even 
before the much more daring ideas by Beresnevičius. With broader Lithuanian pub-
lic remaining ambiguous about the lessons of the ancient Lithuania’s history for the 
present and future foreign policy of the Lithuanian state, academic historians in this 
country are much more open to the idea that GDL indeed was empire in comparison 
with the historians in the I Republic of Lithuania. 
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